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is laid the evidence serves no purpose, because the defendant has
already proved that he acted in self defense.1
The question of whether a particular hostile demonstration
was of such a nature as to place the defendant in a reasonable
fear of immediate death or bodily injury is one which must be
determined by the jury. Thus the inquiry is directed to the situ-
ation as it appeared to the defendant at the time of the killing.
Evidence of prior threats by the deceased which are known to
the defendant, or evidence of his bad character, is important only
in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that
the defensive measures were necessary. If this has already been
established by other testimony, proof of prior threats and dan-
gerous character of the assailant would be superfluous. Hence,
this evidence is excluded by the Louisiana courts in the only situ-
ation in which it could be of real value to the defendant. A better
rule requires proof of some overt aggressive act as a condition
precedent; however, the hostile demonstration need not be one
which, taken alone, would reasonably warrant extreme defensive
measures.' 2  H.W.
EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF PHYSICIANS AS TO MENTAL CAPACITY
-Eleven months after conveying his farm to defendant, the
grantor was pronounced incapable of caring for his estate be-
cause of old age and physical infirmities. He was not found to be
insane. His conservator sought to set aside the conveyance, con-
tending that the grantor was mentally incompetent when it was
made. Physicians and laymen who were acquainted with the
of 1921, which states: "The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
shall also extend to criminal cases on questions of law alone . . ." Art. 19,
§ 9 states: ". . . The jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of the
law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been
charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge." He
argues that where the defendant invokes a plea of self-defense, the question
of whether the deceased was the aggressor in the fatal difficulty is a ques-
tion of fact upon which the guilt or innocence of the defendant depends,
and that proof of prior threats are admissible only for the purpose of show-
ing who was the aggressor when the question is in doubt, and to allow the
judge to withdraw that question from the jury and decide it is in violation
of Art. 19, § 9; and for the Supreme Court to review such a decision is in
violation of Art. 7, § 10. The courts have refused to hold this a question of
law. State v. Sandiford, 149 La. 933, 90 So. 261 (1921); State v. Brown, 172 La.
121, 133 So. 383 (1932); State v. Stracner, 190 La. 457, 182 So. 571 (1938).
11. For example, in State v. Williams, 46 La. Ann. 709, 711, 15 So. 82, 83
(1894), the court said: "In order to constitute the overt act that would justify
the taking of human life there must be some demonstration made by the
deceased against the accused of such a character as to impress upon him
that he was in imminent danger of his life or some great bodily harm."
12. State v. Padula, 106 Conn. 54, 138 Atl. 456 (1927).
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grantor were allowed to give their opinions as to his mental
capacity. Held, that the testimony of physicians was entitled to
no more weight than that of laymen of good common sense and
judgment. Wharton v. Meyers, 371 Ill. 546, 21 N.E. (2d) 772
(1939).
Because of confusion regarding the opinion rule, the decision
in the present case might at first appear erroneous. However, an
analysis" of admissable opinion demonstrates its soundness.
2
Without attempting a philosophical distinction between opinion
and fact,3 it can be said that admissable "opinion" may be divided
into two classes: (1) that which is not opinion, strictly speaking,
and (2) that which is opinion.
Into the first group fall those cases in which the witness is
allowed to state an opinion because it would be difficult or im-
possible to state the facts observed.4 This is sometimes termed a
"compendious statement" or "shorthand statement of fact."'5 It
is under this classification that the "opinion" of non-experts is
admitted in insanity cases. 6 The Massachusetts rule, limiting the
non-expert to the use of certain words,7 is thus an unreasoned
reaction to the uncertain meaning given to the word "opinion."
1. For a similar classification see Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527, 57
N.E. 757 (1900).
2. The rule has been consistently followed by the Illinois courts: Car-
penter v. Calvert, 83 Ill. 62 (1876); Austin v. Austin, 260 Ill. 299, 103 N.E.
268 (1913); Sharkey v. Sisson, 310 Ill. 98, 141 N.E. 427 (1923); McGregor v.
Keun, 330 Ill. 106, 161 N.E. 99 (1928); Kasbohm v. Miller, 366 Ill. 484, 9 N.E.
(2d) 216 (1937).
3. L. Hand, Cir. J., in Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Monahan, 11 F.
(2d) 212, 214 (1926) suggests: "The line between opinion and fact is at best
only one of degree .. " Wigmore states that there is no virtue in any
distinction resting on a contrast between "opinion" and "fact." Wigmore,
Evidence (2 ed. 1923) § 1919. It is hoped that the present attempt at a "rule
of thumb" does not violate the principles of Wigmore's "Rule of Superoroga-
tory Exclusion." Wigmore, op. cit. supra, at § 1918.
4. An exhaustive collection of cases allowing a layman to give his opinion
appears in L.R.A. 1918A 681 et seq.
5. Viewed under the present analysis the following matters admitted as
exceptions to the opinion rule are more properly facts: House was damaged
"mighty bad" (Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lynne, 199 Ala. 631, 75 So. 14 (1917));
witness could smell gasoline (King v. Ohio Valley Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
212 Ky. 770, 280 S.W. 127 (1926)); floor was slippery (Blake v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 266 Mass. 12, 164 N.E. 486 (1929)).
6. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 4 S.Ct. 533, 28
L. Ed. 536 (1884).
7. Witness may state that the acts of the person whose sanity is at issue
were "rational" or "irrational." Fayette v. Chesterville, 77 Me. 28, 52 Am.
Rep. 741 (1885); Williams v. Spencer, 150 Mass. 346, 23 N.E. 105 (1890);
People v. Strait, 148 N.Y. 566, 42 N.E. 1045 (1896). But Massachusetts allows
an attending physician to give his "opinion," though not an expert on mental
diseases. Hastings v. Rider, 99 Mass. 622 (1868). Foster, C. J., in Hardy v.
Merril, 56 N.H. 227, 252 (1875), characterized the rule as "mere, sheer logo-
machy."
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Generally, the non-expert states (1) his opportunity for observa-
tion of the person whose mental condition is in issue, (2) facts
and circumstances (insofar as possible), and then (3) his opinion. 8
This should be regarded not as a reasoned opinion but as an im-
pression of fact.
In the second class is the opinion of experts10 based upon
hypothetical or observed facts.11 Admission of such opinion is
allowed because of the realized inability of the court and jury to
draw a technical conclusion. 12 This is the true exception to the
opinion rule. The jury remains the sole judge of facts. It is only
when the facts as determined by the jury coincide with those
hypothetical and observed facts upon which the opinion is based' s
that the opinion of the expert is pertinent.
Furthermore, the opinions of skilled witnesses as to observed
facts which the layman would not be able to discern would be
admitted under the first classification, 4 while the opinion as to
the cause or result of such facts, if a proper field for expert testi-
mony, would be classified under the second."3
Under the above analysis, the opinion of the physicians in
the present case clearly comes within the first class. Being mere
statements of fact, their testimony as witnesses was entitled to
no more weight than that of other witnesses who had the same
opportunity for observation. J. M. S.
8. 20 Am. Jur. § 853 (1939); Wigmore, Evidence (2 ed. 1923) § 1922.
Wigmore thinks that the rule is in no way sound because it cumbers exam-
ination.
9. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 4 S.Ct. 533, 28
L. Ed. 536 (1884).
10. The majority of jurisdictions admit any practicing physician as an
expert on insanity. See cases collected in (1928) 54 A.L.R. 860. The better
view requires that an expert be specially qualified: State v. Doiron, 150 La.
550, 90 So. 920 (1922); White v. McPherson, 183 Mass. 533, 67 N.E. 643 (1903);
Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367 (1876); Watson v. State, 133 Tenn. 198, 180 S.W.
168 (1915). The growth of legislation creating boards of alienists illustrates
the value of this requirement. See Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle
of Experts (1935) 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 419.
11. When facts are observed, the physician should state all the facts
before giving an opinion. Foster v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 99 Wis. 447, 75
N.W. 69 (1898). See cases collected in L.R.A. 1915A 1065.
12. For an historical outline see Rosenthal, The Development of the Use
of Expert Testimony (1935) 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 403.
13. The witness cannot be asked his opinion upon the evidence in the
case. People v. McElvaine, 121 N.Y. 250, 24 N.E. 465 (1890).
14. An example would be testimony as to the existence of a disease,
determinable only by a physician. Lay opinion would not be admissible.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 70 F. (2d) 589 (1934); Grattan v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 80 N.Y. 281 (1880).
15. The probable cause of death: Strangulation (Miller v. State, 9 Okla.
Crim. Rep. 255, 131 Pac. 717 (1913)); shock or disease (Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. of U. S. v. Gratiot, 45 Wyo. 1, 14 P. (2d) 438 (1932)).
